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Abstract. This paper advocates for a nuanced understanding of treason and 
encounter in Coetzee’s “Waiting for the Barbarians” (1980) (hereafter WB). 
Although treason and encounter constitute critical sites for Coetzee’s 
interrogation of imperial or dogmatic thought and emphasis on the epistemic and 
agential value of becoming, their interpretive utility to the desire for community 
has remained largely underexplored. Drawing on Gilles Deleuze and Walter 
Benjamin, this paper contends that encounter and becoming-traitor function as 
sites of critique and the genesis of a new thought on the alternative community. 
The paper shows that beneath the dystopian atmosphere that pervades WB, 
Coetzee is a thinker of new thought as the precondition for the emergence of a 
new community. By focusing on encounter and becoming-traitor, it draws 
attention to Coetzee’s ethic of what the body can do and interrogates Colonel 
Joll’s narrow understanding of treason. The analysis focuses specifically on 
Magistrate’s encounter with Joll of the Third Bureau and the barbarian girl - as 
central to Magistrate’s becoming-traitor or betrayal of the dehumanising 
apparatus and temporality of “Empire”. 
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What has made it impossible to for us to live in time like fish in water, like 
birds in the air, like children? … Is there any better way to pass these last days 
than in dreaming of a saviour with a sword who will scatter the enemy hosts and 
forgive us the errors that have been committed by others in our name and 
grant us a second chance to build our earthly paradise?  
Coetzee, Waiting for the Barbarians 
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Waiting for the Barbarians (1980) remains one of Coetzee’s most 
critically acclaimed and explored works of fiction. Its exploration of 
the shame of being human, the degradation of the body, the crisis 
of liberal ideology, the fragility of moral universals or Manichaean 
thought, and the philosophical and ethical problematics of war on 
terror defines its untimeliness. Which is why in reading WB one is 
confronted with the question of how it thinks redemption and 
community. This is especially important in light of Coetzee’s 
assertion, in an interview with David Attwell, that: 
 
I am not a herald of community or anything else … I am someone who has 
intimations of freedom (as every chained prisoner has) and constructs 
representations ─ which are shadows themselves ─ of people slipping their 
chains and turning their faces to the light. I do not imagine freedom…I do 
not represent it. Freedom is another name for the unimaginable (Attwell 2003, 
6).  
 
Rather than characterise this as a disavowal of community, I will 
argue that it is a call for criticality thinking towards the aura of 
certainty or faith that usually animates discussions on community. 
As Coetzee goes on to point out, “Community has its basis in an 
awareness and an acceptance of a common justice. You [Attwell] 
use the word faith. Let me be more cautious and stay with the word 
awareness: awareness of an idea of justice, somewhere, that 
transcends laws and law-making. Such an awareness is not absent 
from our lives” (bid. 6). Put differently, redemption and community 
are impossible without a consciousness and recognition of a 
common justice. This search for a common justice constitutes the 
ethical-political axis and epiphany in Coetzee’s fiction. For 
Coetzee’s fictional protagonists, the awareness and acceptance of a 
common justice is the outcome of a radical encounter that calls into 
question habitual thoughts and practices.  
Written during the period when the Apartheid regime in South 
Africa had intensified its terroristic campaign of incarceration and 
torture of critics, WB is first and foremost about torture and the 
crisis of colonial ideology. Coetzee himself has argued that the novel 
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is “about the impact of the torture chamber on the life of a man of 
conscience” (72). The novel is set in an unnamed colonial time-
space and traces the ethical-political awakening of Magistrate, the 
colonial administrator and narrator, at the margins of Empire, as a 
consequence of his encounter with bodies that challenge his most 
cherished convictions. More broadly, WB attacks not only the 
ideology and practices of colonialism/imperialism but all forms of 
coercive socio-political organisation.  
The novel has generated a rich corpus of critical literature on 
issues as diverse as history, torture, barbarism, otherness, the crisis 
of liberal notions of freedom and justice, war on terror, human 
rights, agency and responsibility, disability, and time (Gallagher 
1988; Moses 1993; Detels 2004; Spencer 2008; Hall 2012; 
Asempasah 2013; Winter 2014; Kelly 2015; Lochner 2016). Other 
scholars have focused on the type of future WB summons. 
Opinions are, however, divided on this. On the one hand, some 
critics argue that WB presents us with the possibility of a new world 
or community (Crary 2017, 131; Jolly 1989, 78; Durrant 2004, 1). 
On the other hand, drawing on the “apocalyptic figure of the 
marked or mutilated body”, Russell Samolsky contends that WB 
should be read “as proleptic of future catastrophe” (Samolsky 2011, 
31). For Samolsky, the “apocalyptic legibility” undercuts any weak 
messianic or redemptive vision in WB (Samolsky 2011, 177). 
Furthermore, encounter and its destabilizing power in WB have also 
been examined by a number of scholars. Kamel Abdaoui asserts that 
in Coetzee’s fiction “encountering the Other (…) is a convulsive 
and dislocating event that forces the Self to undertake a decisive and 
critical journey across identities” (Abdaoui 2018, 7-8). While 
Abdaoui is broadly right, his claim that hybridization is the end 
result of the Self/Other encounter in Coetzee’s fiction is 
problematic. As Coetzee’s idea of common justice suggests, far from 
a quest for hybridization Coetzee is interested in a shared ethical-
political ethos that permits the coexistence of different identities.  
Drawing on Deleuze’s notion of encounter and Benjamin’s idea 
of becoming-traitor, this paper argues for a nuanced reading of 
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encounter and treason in WB as modalities for the genesis of 
thought on redemption and community. Contrary to Abdaoui, I will 
argue that in WB, in particular, encounter unleashes treason, 
betrayal or becoming-traitor as preconditions for a future 
community. Encounter has become, in the last few years, a topical 
idea in discussions across many disciplines (See Helen F. Wilson’s 
“On geography and encounter: Bodies, borders and difference” 
(2014) for detailed discussion on the cross-disciplinary deployment 
of the notion of Encounter). One of the most influential has been 
Pratt’s notion of “contact zones” (1991; 1992). For Pratt, the 
“contact zone” is the space of colonial encounter where “cultures 
met, clashed and grappled with each other” in highly asymmetrical 
relations of power. According to Pratt, “the contact zone” was 
marked by two broad forms of affects: “rage, incomprehension, and 
pain” and “exhilarating moments of wonder and revelation, mutual 
understanding, and new wisdom” (Pratt 1991, 39). However, it is to 
Deleuze rather than Pratt that we turn. This may appear surprising 
considering that Deleuze develops his idea of encounter in relation 
to his critique of representation “as the constitutive mode of 
knowledge-formation” (Hamilton 2011, xi). Nonetheless, the 
Deleuzian encounter has implications for reading WB, especially 
when placed within the context of Deleuze-Spinoza ethological 
ethics on “the materiality of existence or physics of the body” 
(Gatens 2002, 100). Deleuze’s articulates his conception of the 
productive role of encounter in the following words: 
 
The conditions of a true critique and a true creation are the same: the 
destruction of an image of thought, which presupposes itself, and the genesis 
of the act of thinking in thought itself. Something in the world forces us to 
think. This something is an object not of recognition but of a fundamental 
encounter (Deleuze 1994, 139). 
 
It is important to note that there is precedent for the application of 
Deleuzian concepts and ideas to read WB. Hamilton (2010; 2011; 
2018) and Nashef (2010) have discussed Magistrate’s transformation 
in terms of becoming-nomad, becoming-woman, and becoming-
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animal. However, by drawing mainly on Deleuzian becoming, these 
scholars have missed Magistrate’s becoming-traitor, which Coetzee 
foregrounds as a radical agency and critique of Doxa. It is here that 
Benjamin becomes pertinent.  
In “The Author as Producer” Benjamin proposed becoming-
traitor as a radical strategy of ideological and ethical repositioning 
that dismantles dominant power structures and summons a people 
to come. Writing at the time of controversy over the role of the 
intellectual/writer in the proletarian revolution, Benjamin argued 
that the role of the intellectual was to transform the existing 
structure. Consequently, mere ideological solidarity with the 
proletariat was undesirable since it left the oppressive ideological 
structure intact. Framing the issue at stake in terms of the opposition 
between transmission and transformation, Benjamin argued that the 
intellectual’s role was to transform the capitalist apparatus of 
production and not to transmit it. But how does the intellectual 
become the transmitter of new realities when he owns his means of 
production to the bourgeois class and, therefore, is “on the basis of 
the privilege of culture solidary with it, even more so it with him” 
(Benjamin 1970: 228). Benjamin’s solution was that “the 
revolutionary intellectual” must become “a traitor to his class of 
origin” (1970: 237). To become a traitor meant “betrayal [that] 
consists, in the case of the writer, in behaviour which changes him 
from a reproducer of the apparatus of production into an engineer 
who sees his task as the effort of adapting that apparatus to the aims 
of the proletarian revolution” (237-238).  
It is clear that Benjamin’s viewed becoming-traitor as a key tactic 
in the realisation of a communist community. In this paper, we 
abandon Benjamin’s Marxist idioms of “class” and “bourgeois” and 
redefine becoming-traitor not just as ideological repositioning but 
also as an ethic of leaping out of apparatus of capture. Leaping out 
should be understood within the specific context of exile as ex salire. 
Contrary to the dominant understanding of exile as exsul (banished, 
living abroad, homeless), Nico Israel argues that exile has another 
etymology, ex salire, which “expresses a sense of ‘leaping out’ toward 
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something or somewhere, implying a matter of will’ (Israel 2000: 1). 
Embedded in ex salire as leaping out is the notion of agency and the 
production of the new. To become a traitor, as we use in connection 
with Magistrate, is to become an exile. As will become clear, by 
becoming-traitor to Empire Magistrate positions himself as a traitor 
and an exilic figure. This sheds new light on Magistrate’s 
interpretation of the barbarian slips. Although critics have dwelt on 
Colonel Joll’s accusation of Magistrate of treason, they have rarely 
paid attention to the subtle differentiated ways treason operates in 
WB as becoming-traitor or leaping out and to the desire for people 
to come. 
Having clarified the conceptual framework for our analysis, the 
rest of the paper examines becoming-traitor in WB from the 
following perspectives: encounter as the genesis of thought and a 
break with Empire or the State thought, and what the body can do. 
Together, these constitute true betrayal that summons the people to 
come since they function as ethical responses to the shame of being 
human. The critical turning point in WB is Magistrate’s betrayal or 
repudiation of Empire. By that act, Coetzee suggests that the quest 
for an awareness and acceptance of a common justice is contingent 
on a treasonable act or betrayal of that which imprisons the 
individual and prevents the emergence of alternative ways of being. 
Hence Joll’s accusation of Magistrate for “treasonously consorting 
with the enemy” (Coetzee 1980, 85) represents a fragment of a more 
profound meaning of treason or betrayal in WB. The challenge for 
the reader then is to understand how “treason” functions as an 
apparatus of capture by the State and, at a deeper level, as the 
precondition for a genuine community.   
We can now examine how WB instantiates Empire’s dogmatism 
and the genesis of thought in the context of encounter. WB begins 
with the arrival of Colonel Joll at the colonial outpost to quell a 
rumoured barbarian invasion. Prior to the arrival of Joll and his 
force from the capital, the colonial outpost had been administered 
by Magistrate. As the administrative officer of the district, he 
believed that he represented the civilising power of Empire. He did 
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not only collect tithes and taxes, protect trade routes, administer the 
communal lands, and supervise the settler garrison; he also 
administered justice by presiding over the law-court. Magistrate had 
succeeded in managing the walled settler town of three thousand 
inhabitants as the bastion of civilisation in a desert of ruins and 
barbarians. He derived satisfaction as “a responsible official in the 
service of Empire” and as he waited for his retirement he indulged 
himself by reading the classics and excavating the ruins (41). There 
is a certain delusion and taken-for-grantedness on Magistrate’s part 
on the nobility of his stewardship at the colonial outpost. His 
conviction did not raise any ethical issues for him about his role as 
the agent of Empire since he had not been confronted with any 
crisis that problematises what he represents. At this point in his 
career, the image that Magistrate crafts for himself can be described 
as a colonial father who, to borrow from Fanon, “unceasingly 
restrains [his] fundamentally perverse offspring from managing to 
commit suicide and from giving free rein to its evil instincts” (Fanon 
1968, 170).  
However, the military operation to flush out the barbarian threat 
results in the imposition of emergency powers and unleashes a year-
long violent regime of imperial “spectacles of debasement and 
suffering and death” (Coetzee 1980, 131) that puts into question the 
epistemological authority of Empire as the bulwark of civilisation. 
Magistrate is removed as the administrator. He comes to realise that 
Empire is not defined by principles of autonomy, justice, progress 
and freedom as he had assumed but, to borrow from Deleuze, by 
the “perpetuation or conservation of organs of power” (Deleuze 
1987, 394) that require from its servants not love but “merely that 
they perform their duty” (Coetzee 1980, 6). The duplicity and 
dogmatism of Empire is represented by Joll’s terroristic invasion of 
the frontier town. Colonel Joll and Warrant Officer Mandel’s 
actions are motivated by the conviction that the survival of Empire 
depends on the containment and liquidation of barbarians. The 
irony, which WB points out, is that Empire’s project of normality 
or imperial control over Others is impossible without dehumanising 
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and characterising them as barbarians. As Magistrate is quick to 
inform the young officer “The people we call barbarians are 
nomads, they migrate between the lowlands and the uplands every 
year, that is their way of life” (Coetzee 1980, 54). In other words, 
the category “barbarians” in so far as it designates the Other is an 
imposition by the colonial power as a result of its contempt for and 
fear of the Other. It is here that Coetzee gets to the horror at the 
heart of Empire’s civilisatrice mission and normality: Empire is 
inherently the denigration of being; the manufacture of bestial life, 
shame and humiliation through spectacles of torture. Coetzee’s 
strategic move is to expose the complicity of Magistrate’s liberalism 
in Empire’s dehumanisation of being by unsettling his illusion of 
colonial beneficence through a radical encounter with Colonel Joll 
and Warrant Officer Mandel on the one hand, and the barbarian girl 
on the other. It is in staging these encounters that Coetzee succeeds 
in revealing the hidden shame, humiliation and cruelty in the 
rhetoric of Empire as civilisation and engendering thought on what 
it means to be human. 
It is therefore impossible to appreciate the criticality of the 
thematic of redemption, becoming-traitor, and community in WB 
without reflecting on the critical place of the encounter. A genuine 
encounter challenges preconceived ideas or categories and 
confronts thought with its breakdown that forces it to think. As 
O’Sullivan observes, a genuine encounter functions as “a rupture in 
our habitual modes of being and thus our habitual subjectivities. It 
produces a cut, a crack…for the rupturing encounter also contains 
a moment of affirmation, the affirmation of a new world…a way of 
seeing and thinking this world differently” (O’Sullivan 2006, 1). This 
is why a radical encounter takes on the character of original violence 
inflicted on thought and awakens thought from its natural stupor 
and conformism, which Doxa imposes (Deleuze 1994, 139).  
The first and originary encounter in WB, then, is Magistrate’s 
encounter with Joll. Magistrate’s becoming-traitor can be 
understood in the context of this encounter, its ramifications and 
his subsequent encounter with the partially blind and crippled 
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barbarian girl. Magistrate’s initial attitude to the activities of Joll is 
indifference to annihilation. However, once he, the advocate of law 
and justice, is imprisoned and tortured in the same room where the 
barbarians had been tortured and some killed, Magistrate comes face 
to face with the dark side of Empire. The violence of this encounter 
to Magistrate’s thought is the subject matter of the novel.  
It is important to focus on the consequences of Empire’s fixation 
on recognition or representation that Magistrate’s encounter with Joll 
makes visible. Joll arrives at the obscure frontier town with a single 
mission: to find the truth and to exterminate it. The truth Joll and 
the Third Bureau are seeking is first and foremost a confirmation of 
their definition of the barbarians as a threat to Empire. For Joll, to 
recognise a barbarian is to ratify the rumour that the barbarians are 
planning an invasion on Empire. Where this implicit claim becomes 
impossible to sustain, Joll and Mandel use force to extort 
confessions. Joll’s obsession with the truth of the barbarian as the 
enemy of Empire/State could be understood in terms of Deleuze’s 
observation that underlying the dogmatic Image of thought is the 
presupposition that “thought has an affinity with the true; it formally 
possesses the true and materially wants the true” (Deleuze 1994, 
131). Like Deleuze, Coetzee suggests that this attitude breeds “life-
giving illusions”, barbarism and acts of terror. The enduring value 
of WB then is that it explores with the poignant economy of 
reflexivity the consequences of Empires’ preoccupation with its 
truth of the Other as a barbarian; the shame of complicity and 
compromise, and the place of conscience and responsibility under a 
draconian regime. Hence the importance of Magistrate’s intense 
grappling with the meaning of justice, law and order, freedom and being. 
Early in the novel, in a conversation with Joll after overhearing the 
latter’s torture of the barbarian old man who had been falsely 
arrested and accused, Magistrate interrogates Joll on truth and the 
responsibility of the interrogator. Joll’s response is revealing: “There 
is a certain tone. A certain tone enters the voice of a man who is 
telling the truth. Training and experience teach us to recognize the 
tone” (Coetzee 1980, 5). This is the first revelation that Magistrate’s 
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encounter with Joll brings up. The novel explores the implications 
of this dogmatic attitude which Magistrate aptly summarised as 
“Pain is truth: all else is subject to doubt” (Coetzee 1980, 5). Joll’s 
philosophy contradicts Magistrate’s insistence on law and justice as 
the truth of our humanity.  
Another instance of Magistrate’s encounter with the shame of 
Empire is the “exemplary spectacle” of the writing scene at the 
square. The first expeditionary force into the hinterland led by 
Colonel Joll returns to the settler town square with twelve miserable 
barbarian captives to prove to the people that the barbarians are real 
(Coetzee 1980, 113). They are brought in “stark naked” with “a loop 
of wire running through the flesh of each man’s hands and through 
holes pierced in his cheeks” (Ibid). After failing to escape the 
contamination of the atrocity to be committed on the barbarians, 
Magistrate is forced to join the crowd of thousands that have 
gathered to observe the undignified spectacle. Using a stick of 
charcoal, Colonel Joll first writes on each barbarian “ENEMY… 
ENEMY… ENEMY” (Coetzee 1980, 115). We see here the 
convergence of or complicity between writing and colonial violence 
and cruelty. Ironically, this cruel colonial calligraphy unsettles 
Empire’s moral and epistemological authority in that it 
demonstrates that barbarians are not Others that Empire’s civilizes; 
they are constructions. After Joll’s inscription, the barbarians are 
flogged to the pleasure of the “civilised” crowd until the black 
charcoal, the dust, the sweat and blood become indistinguishable. 
The height of this depravity occurs when Joll takes a four-pound 
hammer to beat them. It is at this point that Magistrate is forced to 
yell: ‘No! No! No! You are depraving the people! (…) You would not 
use a hammer on a beast, not on a beast…Look! We are the great 
miracle of creation!” (Coetzee 1980, 116-17). For this rude 
interruption of Empire’s cruel game of definition, inscription and 
exhibition, Magistrate is clubbed down by Colonel Joll’s men. This 
encounter with the violence of Empire makes him think about what 
it means to describe barbarians as miracles of creation, as “Men” and 
to demand justice for them. Magistrate is for the first time 
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confronted with the contradiction of the heart of Empire: the gap 
between the aspiration to universalise autonomy and justice, and the 
impossibility of demanding the same for the Other. How can one 
demand justice and equality for the Other who, by Empire’s 
rationalisation, are not “Men”?  
This is why Justice is Empire’s arch-enemy since it can only 
become meaningful when the ideology of domination of other 
peoples and their lands and resources is abandoned and a new 
sociability or community becomes thinkable. This is the new 
trajectory Magistrate’s thought begins to take. Prior to his encounter 
with Joll, his philosophy was based on the primacy of law and 
justice. He saw his duty as ensuring that “memory of justice does 
not fail” (Coetzee 1980, 152). However, confronted with the “new 
science of degradation that kills people on their knees,” Magistrates 
realises that if there is to be the possibility of a people to come, it 
will require a redefinition of law and justice. Towards the end of the 
novel, when Joll and the Third Bureau destroy the settlers’ “world 
of tranquil certainties”, Magistrate rightly begins to think of the 
“task of rebuilding” (Coetzee 1980, 156). This task is contingent on 
a becoming-traitor and new thought.  
An important aspect of Magistrate’s encounter with Joll Bureau 
occurs when he is arrested and interrogated after returning from 
leading the barbarian girl back to her people. Magistrate had found 
the barbarian girl begging at the gates of the barracks. To relieve her 
of the shame of begging, he installed her in the barracks kitchen as 
a “scullery-maid. The journey to the limits of Empire brings 
Magistrate face-to-face with “the brown-faced, weather-beaten, 
narrow-eyed barbarians on native soil” (Coetzee 1980, 76). It is at 
once an anxious and revealing encounter. First, with no means of 
communication, the encounter between the coloniser and the 
barbarians is reduced to silence and gazing at each other. We can 
surmise that this gaze engenders disturbing questions for Magistrate: 
what did the barbarians see in him? What does he represent? Did 
they see him, as the Namaqua Hottentots in Dusklands (1974) saw 
Jacobus Coetzee as “an irrelevance” or “another accident” (Coetzee 
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1974, 98) unworthy of their most serious attention? Secondly, the 
barbarian girl’s rejection of Magistrate’s request to return to the 
town on her “own choice” constitutes a potent indictment and 
rejection of Empire’s civilising pretentions. Being-together is 
possible only when the axiomatics of Empire is abandoned and a 
new ethics of being is founded.  
For making contact with the barbarians and “contracting a 
liaison” (Coetzee 1980, 91) with the girl, Magistrate is charged with 
“treasonously consorting with the enemy” (Coetzee 1980, 85) and 
confined by Joll. The interrogation presents to him, for the first 
time, the rare opportunity to challenge Joll’s notions of what Empire 
represents. To Joll’s claim that “the natives are at war with us,” 
Magistrate counters “Unless we are the enemy” (85). He shifts the 
definition of “barbarians” to refer specifically to Empire. He 
describes Joll and his men as “the new barbarians” (Coetzee 1980, 
85). We see here Magistrate’s redefinition of treason or betrayal as 
liberation. Once he has been charged with treason, he concludes, 
“my alliance with the guardians of Empire is over. I have set myself 
in opposition, the bond is broken, I am a free man (Coetzee 1980, 
85). In other words, he becomes a traitor and an exile. But as 
Magistrate realises this freedom that his becoming-traitor to Empire 
inaugurates is a dangerous one. Not only will he suffer pain, 
loneliness and hunger as a result of his confinement, he will also be 
hung upside down at the square floating back and forth in “an arc a 
foot above the ground like a great old moth with its wings pinched 
together, roaring, shouting” (Coetzee 1980, 133). The people 
enjoying the spectacle interpret Magistrate’s roars and shouts of 
agony and humiliation as “the barbarian language”.  
An indication of how Magistrate’s encounter with the violence 
of Empire and the barbarian girl produces new thought can be seen 
in the interview session when he is brought before Joll and asked to 
decipher the slips he had excavated. Joll and his men had found the 
chest of wooden slips in Magistrate’s apartment and assumed that it 
represented communication between him and the barbarians. Joll 
cannot read the barbarian scripts. His ingenious interpretation of 
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the slips constitutes a powerful critique of Empire. This encounter 
reveals the limits of its power to define and the extent to which he 
has leapt out of the semiotics of Empire. Attwell has described 
Magistrate’s performance in this episode as directed at 
“undermining Joll’s terroristic drive for certainty, for truth” (Attwell 
1993, 78). What is more, it signals Magistrate’s transformation into 
a traitor to Empire as a particular structure of thought, feeling and 
practice.  
To grasp the radicalism of his interpretive performance, it is 
significant to remember that before the arrival of Joll and his men, 
Magistrate had been unsuccessful at deciphering the barbarian slips. 
What has changed between then and this translation that he is 
forced to present to Joll is that his encounters with the barbarian girl 
and the debasing activities of the Third Bureau have engendered a 
new mode of thought that operates outside the hermeneutics of 
Empire. By giving voice to the barbarian slips and in the process 
staging a new regime of meaning that is antithetical to Empire’s 
conception of the barbarians as a people without history and 
writing, Magistrate radically reorients his relation as a traitor and an 
exile and in the process becomes a producer of new realities rather 
than a transmitter of Doxa. Magistrate’s reading deliberately 
privileges war, vengeance, justice and history in order to problematize 
Empire’s deployment of these foundational concepts and to raise 
the issues of ethics and responsibility. His betrayal or exile alienates 
him and transforms him into an object of scorn and ridicule. As Joll 
tells him, far from becoming “the One Just Man” and a “martyr” 
who sacrifices his “freedom to his principles”, he is merely “a 
clown,” a dirty “madman…an old beggar-man…a refuse-
scavenger” with no future (Coetzee 1980, 125). In Empire’s 
grammar of disgust and profane, Magistrate has become a “traitor” 
for his refusal to “affirm allegiance to Empire” (Coetzee 1980, 143). 
However, contrary to Joll’s claim, Magistrate’s treason or exile 
signifies the obsolescence of Empire’s logic of community and 
looks forward to a radically different community.  
The last defining encounter in WB is Magistrate’s encounter with 
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the partially blind and crippled barbarian girl. She was part of a 
group of barbarians prisoners rounded up from their village by Joll 
and brought to the settler town in his quest for the truth about the 
barbarian invasion. Her father died at the hands of Joll. Joll’s cruel 
methods of extracting confessions have left her partially blind and 
crippled. Disfigured, abandoned and a beggar, she is a living symbol 
of imperial disfiguration and disposability. Although Magistrate 
rescues and installs her in the kitchen, he also regularly invites her 
to his apartment. His encounter and relationship with the barbarian 
girl is at the centre of Coetzee’s indictment of the duplicity of 
Empire and the quest for a new sociality. Magistrate’s relations with 
the girl is dominated by an intense desire to decipher her body in 
order to get to the truth of what actually happened to her in the 
torture room. However, it is this inordinate desire that exposes 
Magistrate’s complicity in the dehumanisation of the barbarians and 
makes him realise that he is no different from Joll, as he had 
assumed. Magistrate’s encounter with Joll and the barbarian girl 
complicates Empire’s conception of Otherness. Joll represents the 
intimate Other, the always already dark side of Empire.   
The analysis has shown that Magistrate’s encounters with Joll and 
the blind barbarian girl are traumatic and enabling sites. But we have 
yet to explore encounter in terms of the ethics of what the body can do 
or ethology. Simply put, what a body can do “corresponds to the 
nature and limits of its capacity to be affected” (Deleuze 1990, 218). 
Although our aim is not an ethological analysis, ethology, in so far 
as it emphasises the affective implications of bodily encounter, is 
essential to further clarifying Magistrate’s becoming-traitor. It must 
be admitted that Deleuze does not draw an explicit connection 
between encounter as the genesis of thought and encounter in terms 
of Spinoza’s “physics of bodies.” Nonetheless, as the following 
analysis reveals, the circumstances of Magistrate’s becoming-traitor 
makes such a synthesis possible and allows us to describe the quest 
for community or a common justice in terms of “the composition 
of relations between existing bodies” that yield joy (Deleuze 1988, 
115). Our analysis draws on Deleuze’s reading of Spinoza’s Ethics. 
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According to Deleuze, Spinoza’s singular contribution to the 
modern conceptions of individuality is his recognition that “a body 
affects other bodies or is affected by other bodies” (Deleuze 1988, 
123). This has radical implications since a body’s individuality is now 
defined by its capacity for affecting or being affected.  
Ethology is the study of animal and human behaviour from the 
perspective of “their powers and their capacities for affecting and 
being affected” (Gatens and Lloyd 100). Ethological analysis makes 
a crucial distinction between active affections or actions and passive 
affections or passions. Actions and Passions describe two 
conceptualisations of the possible outcomes of a body’s encounter 
with another body. When a body encounters another one, such as 
Magistrate encounters Joll and the barbarian girl, and the two bodies 
are incompatible, the result is sadness. We have already seen how 
Magistrate’s encounter with Joll and his men occasions the 
degradation of the barbarian body, the production of shame and 
humiliation. The barbarians and Magistrate are therefore affected or 
acted upon by Joll and his cohorts. The result is sad passions. 
Passions, it is important to note, have their origin outside the 
individual and diminish the power of acting. As Deleuze argues “sad 
passions represent the lowest degree of our power, the moment 
when we are most separated from our power of acting, when we are 
most alienated, delivered over to the phantoms of superstition, to 
the mystifications of the tyrant” (Deleuze 1988, 123). Conversely, 
when we encounter another body that agrees with us, the encounter 
produces joy and increases our power to act. A joyful encounter is 
the result of a common notion, which refers to agreement, or 
understanding, that makes it possible for bodies to co-exist joyfully. 
Coetzee’s assertion that an awareness and acceptance of a common 
justice is the basis of community is uncannily similar to Deleuzo-
Spinoza’s notion of common notions as that which makes the 
coming-into-being of community possible.   
The distinction between encounters that increase our power to 
act and those that diminish or decompose has two implications for 
our reading of WB. Firstly, it enables us to redefine Evil. From Joll’s 
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imperial perspective, barbarians are evil or enemies of Empire. 
From an ethological emphasis on passions and actions, however, evil 
is defined in terms of any power that threatens or decomposes the 
composition of convivial relations. As Deleuze asserts, in 
ethological analysis “evil is always a bad encounter” (Deleuze 1990, 247; 
emphasis included). This illuminates Coetzee’s shift in emphasis 
from the Other as evil to evil, as a bad encounter which degrades 
life. If evil is not located in specific groups but bodies that produce 
sadness, then the ethical responsibility lies in producing encounters 
that generate shared values. If the dominant ethological encounter 
in WB is the one that decomposes bodies, diminishes their power to 
act and therefore imposes suffering, then the quest for a new 
community is paramount. What this reveals is that encounter, 
understood in terms of affections, supplements our initial analysis 
of encounter as violence that provokes the genesis of thought. 
These two conceptualisations have a profound bearing on reading 
WB not only as an exploration of colonial torture or violence but, 
more importantly, as the search for an alternative composition of 
relations or affective compatibilities.  
We can now examine the meaning of Magistrate’s becoming-
traitor to Empire. His becoming-traitor is first and foremost an 
awakening of consciousness that allows him to see his true place in 
Empire. As he acknowledges, “I was the lie that Empire tells itself 
when times are easy, he [Colonel Joll] the truth that Empire tells 
when harsh winds blow. Two sides of Imperial rule, no more, no 
less” (Coetzee 1980, 149). This epiphany signifies a fundamental 
ethical shift from his initial position that he was the good servant of 
Empire dispensing Law and Justice at its margins. Reflecting on why 
it was impossible to inaugurate positive encounters, Magistrate 
makes his most insightful statement: 
 
It is the fault of Empire! Empire has created the time of history. Empire has 
located its existence not in the smooth recurrent spinning time of the cycle of 
the seasons but in the jagged time of rise and fall, of beginning and end, of 
catastrophe. Empire dooms itself to live in history and to plot against history. 
One thought alone preoccupies the submerged mind of Empire: how not to 
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end, how not to die, how to prolong its era. By day it pursues its enemies …By 
night it feeds on images of disaster: the sack of cities, the rape of populations, 
pyramids of bones, acres of desolation. A mad vision yet a virulent one 
(Coetzee 1980, 146). 
 
This is not just a diagnosis of what Empire represents; it is 
Magistrate’s valediction to Empire as a form of history and 
community. Although at the end of the novel Magistrate is 
reinstated as the administrator, it is clear that he is a transformed 
character no longer under the illusions of imperial superiority. He 
realises that to live outside the history of Empire means organising 
encounters that will produce joy.  
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Our analysis has shown that a nuanced reading of encounter and 
treason in WB yields significant insights rarely articulated in the 
existing literature. One important implication of our approach is 
that it redefines Magistrate’s agency and signification. Far from 
being a victim, Magistrate is a herald of a coming community. His 
ethical transformation calls for a re-examination of his claim, 
towards the end of the novel, that “When some men suffer unjustly 
it is the fate of those who witness their suffering to suffer the shame 
of it” (152). Magistrate is more than just a witness; he is an exilic 
figure who resists Empire through his betrayal.  
In a profound way, Magistrate’s becoming-traitor implies that he 
is the last man at the end of history. This recalls Francis Fukuyama’s 
The End of History and the Last Man (1992). For Fukuyama, the end 
of history means the triumph of liberal democratic capitalism over 
its ideological competitors. The universalisation of capitalism, 
Fukuyama argues, means that ‘there would be no further progress 
in the development of underlying principles and institutions, 
because all the really big questions had been settled’ (Fukuyama 
1992, xii). It is important to stress that the end of History is not to 
Rogers Asempasah – Becoming Traitor at the Margins of “Empire” 
70 
be taken literally. In fact, for Fukuyama, it refers to “the endpoint 
of mankind’s ideological evolutions” (ix).  
In WB, the end of history refers to the dissolution or collapse of 
the moral and political legitimacy of Empire and the termination of 
its arborescent image of thought, which breeds violence and shame. 
History, in WB, refers to Empire as a type of cruel historical 
encounter or socio-political organisation. As Colonel Joll tells 
Magistrate, this history is indifferent to the martyrs of freedom and 
equality and the dehumanisation or spectacles of cruelty that Empire 
stages in the colony. History, for Empire, is about its victories; its 
domination of territories and practices condensed in the idiom of 
normality. Hence, the post-historical man in WB is one who has 
escaped the duplicity of Empire and summons a new community 
and historical configuration; the post-historical man bears witness 
to the irrationality of Empire’s normality. In this sense, Magistrate 
is the last man of a specific history. As the last man of the end of 
Empire’s history, therefore, Magistrate acknowledges that “a 
paradise on earth” will not only be a community beyond Good and 
Evil but one that will be based on the art of making “concessions” 
(Coetzee 1980, 169). It is therefore significant that Magistrate 
regards himself as the “last magistrate” (Coetzee 1980, 168); an 
acceptance that Empire and its time of history are dead.  
Unlike Fukuyama, Coetzee’s last man of history is one who 
speaks the truth of a new man and a new way of organising 
encounters between and among people in order to produce an oasis 
of mutual coexistence. The end of history in WB then is not about 
the triumph of liberal democratic capitalism but the realisation that 
the “history that Empire imposes on its subjects, even its lost 
subjects” is “cause for shame” (Coetzee 1980, 169). To become a 
traitor to Empire is to become a lost subject, an exile and a post-
historical man.  
I began with the epigram from WB in which Magistrate 
ruminates on forgiveness and the possibility of a “second chance to 
build our earthly paradise” (Coetzee 1980, 173). The choice of this 
epigram was not only intended to emphasise the centrality of the 
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quest for a different community but also to register the ethical gap 
that separates Jacobus Coetzee in Dusklands and Magistrate in WB. 
After having killed the Hottentots for no apparent reason other than 
to assert his reality and mastery, Jacobus rationalises his violent acts 
as: 
 
No more than any other man do I enjoy killing; but I have taken it upon myself 
to be the one to pull the trigger, performing this sacrifice for myself and my 
countrymen, who exist, and committing upon the dark folk the murders we 
have all wished. All are guilty, without exception. I include the Hottentots. 
Who knows for what unimaginable crimes of the spirit they died, through me? 
God’s judgment is just, irreprehensible and incomprehensible. His mercy pays 
no heed to merit. I am a tool in the hands of history (Coetzee 1974, 106). 
 
However, as the epigram shows, it is precisely this history that must 
be rejected. What does it mean to position oneself as a tool in the 
hands of history for one's people or race? The difference between 
Magistrate and Jacobus is that the former recognises that the “errors 
that have been committed by others in our name” are bad betrayals 
and therefore require forgiveness that will inaugurate the difficult 
task of building a paradise. Magistrate’s becoming-traitor is, 
therefore, a refutation of Jacobus Coetzee’s sacrificial act on behalf 
of his race.    
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